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CHANNEL SYSTEMS: WHY IS THERE A POSITIVE SPREAD?
ALEKSANDER BERENTSEN, ALESSANDRO MARCHESIANI, AND CHRISTOPHER J. WALLER
Abstract. An increasing number of central banks implement monetary policy via two standing
facilities: a lending facility and a deposit facility. In this paper we show that it is socially
optimal to implement a non-zero interest rate spread. We prove this result in a dynamic general
equilibrium model where market participants have heterogeneous liquidity needs and where the
central bank requires government bonds as collateral. We also calibrate the model and discuss
the behavior of the money market rate and the volumes traded at the ECB’s deposit and lending
facilities in response to the recent financial crisis.
JEL classification #: E52, E58, E59
Key words: monetary policy, open market operations, standing facilities
1. Introduction
In a channel system, a central bank oﬀers two facilities: a lending facility whereby it is ready to
supply money overnight at a given lending rate against collateral and a deposit facility whereby
banks can make overnight deposits to earn a deposit rate. The interest-rate corridor is chosen to
keep the interest rate in the money market close to its target. A change in policy is implemented
by simply changing the interest-rate corridor. In theory, there is no need for direct central
bank intervention to control the market rate of interest, since money market participants will
never mutually agree to trade at an interest rate that lies outside the interest rate corridor.1
Furthermore, since market participants prefer to trade amongst themselves rather than access
the standing facilities, it allows the central bank to control the money market rate while incurring
1In practice, central banks still conduct open market operations to adjust the quantity of central bank money in
circulation. In "normal" times, for technical reasons they do so to accommodate, for example, seasonal fluctuations
in the demand for central bank money. In "exceptional" times, in response to severe aggregate shocks they do so
to restore the functioning of money markets. Moreover, in practice, there are cases where the money market rate
lies outside the interest-rate corridor which can often be explained by particular operational details. For example,
in the US Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac have no access to the Federal Reserve’s deposit facility. This institutional
particularity has been brought forward to explain why the money market rate was often below the FED’s deposit
rate during the financial crisis.
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very little operating costs (it reduces the interest paid on deposits and monitoring costs associated
with lending).
In practice, all central banks that operate a channel system choose a non-zero interest-rate
corridor and have a target rate above the deposit rate. From a theoretical perspective, this
behavior is puzzling. First, if controlling the market interest rate is the objective, then why not
set the spread to zero? Doing so allows the central bank to perfectly control the money market
rate. Second, even with a positive spread, why set the target rate above the deposit rate? Cúrdia
and Woodford (2010) argue that setting the target rate at the deposit rate is a way to run the
Friedman rule which eliminates any ineﬃciencies owing to holding ‘idle’ reserves in the banking
system.2
The fact that no central bank chooses a zero corridor and no bank keeps the target rate above
the deposit rate suggests that there are significant frictions that induce the central bank to behave
this way. One potential friction may be the fiscal ramifications associated with paying interest
on deposits. If the central bank sets its target rate at the deposit rate, the central bank would
actually need to make substantial interest payments. Without a portfolio of assets that generates
a flow of income, the central bank must be able to either levy taxes or have the Treasury do so in
order to make the interest payments.3 This power to finance interest payments on reserves may
be limited for several reasons. First, the central bank may not have the power to levy taxes or for
political reasons, is loath to ask for tax revenues from the Treasury. Second, if lump-sum taxation
is not available, then raising taxes to pay interest on reserves requires distortionary taxation.
In this paper, we study the optimality of having a non-zero interest-rate corridor in a general
equilibrium model where market participants face idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, taking into ac-
count potential restrictions on the central bank’s ability to extract tax revenue to pay interest on
2Our paper diﬀers from Cúrdia and Woodford in two important ways. First, we do not have sticky prices. Second,
we do not have ineﬃciencies in the financial intermediation process that gives rise to a need for reserves. It is
this latter ineﬃciency that is eliminated by having suﬃciently high bank reserves, i.e., when banks are satiated
with reserves. Our framework works via a diﬀerent mechanism — a combination of risk sharing and collateral
requirements.
3Fiscal considerations clearly factored in the Federal Reserve’s ability to pay interest on reserves as pointed out
in the following quote: "The Fed got the authority to start paying interest in October 2011 under the Financial
Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, signed into law on Oct. 13, 2006. The reason for the late implementation
was budgetary. Paying interest on reserves will reduce the amount of income the Fed earns on its securities portfolio
and remits to Treasury each year. Congress pushed back the date of implementation to minimize the near-term
impact on the deficit." Source: Real Time Economics Blog, Wall Street Journal, April 29, 2008.
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reserves. First, without restrictions on the central bank’s ability to extract tax revenue, we prove
that the optimal policy involves setting the deposit rate equal to the target rate. In line with
Cúrdia and Woodford, doing so implements the Friedman rule. We then show that the optimal
policy requires that the central bank is able to raise revenue to finance interest on reserves.4
Second, with restrictions on the central bank’s ability to extract tax revenue, the optimal policy
necessitates setting the deposit rate strictly below the target rate. Moreover, it always involves a
strictly positive interest-rate spread. The optimality of a non-zero corridor arises because it im-
proves risk sharing and hence welfare by shifting central bank money to those market participants
who need it most urgently.
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Figure 1: Standing Facilities of the ECB
In addition to studying the theoretical properties of our model, we also calibrate it to the
channel system operated by the European Central Bank (ECB). We wish to discover whether
4Moreover, it is optimal to have a positive interest-rate spread (the diﬀerence between the lending rate and the
deposit rate). The optimality of a strictly positive interest- rate follows from the fact that under the optimal policy,
the borrowing rate does not matter since market participants never borrow at the lending facility. The Friedman
rule allows them to perfectly self-insure against any idiosyncratic liquidity shocks.
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our model can replicate the behavior of the money market interest rate (the Eurepo) and the
volumes of trade at the ECB’s standing facilities. Figure 1 displays the ECB’s channel system.
As can be seen from Figure 1, the Eurepo fluctuates in the middle of the ECB’s interest-rate
corridor (around the minimum bid rate) until the fall of 2008. Thereafter, it fluctuates closely
above the deposit rate set by the ECB. Moreover, the volume of deposits at the deposit facility
and the volume of borrowing at the marginal lending facility of the ECB changed dramatically
around the same time. This can be seen in Figure 2 where we display the daily volume at the
two facilities from January 2007 to July 2010.
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Figure 2: Deposit Facility and Marginal Lending Facility (Millions Euros) 2007-present.
Table 1 presents a summary statistics of the volumes traded at the standing facilities of the
ECB. It displays the average daily volumes of trades at the deposit and lending facilities of the
ECB before and after the Lehman bankruptcy. The average daily volume at the deposit facility
of the ECB prior to the Lehman bankruptcy was 260 million euros. After the bankruptcy, the
average daily volume increased to 150092 million euros; i.e., it is now 578 times higher than
before the Lehman bankruptcy.
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Table 1: Volumes at the ECB
pre Lehman post Lehman ratio post/pre
Deposit Facility 260 150092 578
Marginal Lending Facility 195 1818 9.3
Ratio 1.33 82.6
Average daily volume in million euros at the deposit and lending facilities of the ECB.
Pre-Lehman data from 31.3.2002 until 14.09.2008; Post-Lehman data from 14.09.2008 until 31.03.2010.
The average daily volume at the marginal borrowing facility displays a similar pattern, although
the increase is less pronounced. The average daily volume prior to the Lehman bankruptcy was
195 million euros. After the bankruptcy, the average daily volume increased to 1818 million
euros; i.e., it is now 93 times higher. In Table 1, we also display the ratio of deposits to lending
prior to and after the Lehman bankruptcy. Before it, the ratio was 133, while it now stands at
826.
One would be hard pressed to say that the behavior of the money market rate and the volumes
at the ECB’s facilities are not linked to the severe financial crisis that erupted after the bankruptcy
of Lehman brothers on September 15 2008. With therefore want to address two observations using
our calibration: firstly, what explains the drop in the money market rate below the target rate
during the fall of 2008; and secondly, what explains the extreme increase in volumes at the deposit
facility during the fall of 2008.
We explore two possible explanations. The first hypothesis is that the Lehman bankruptcy
triggered an aggregate variance shock that caused the drop in the Eurepo rate and the increase
of deposits and loans at the ECB’s standing facilities. By aggregate variance shock we mean
that the dispersion in liquidity needs increased dramatically. The second hypothesis is that the
Lehman bankruptcy triggered an aggregate collateral shock. We find that if we choose these two
aggregate shocks appropriately and simultaneously, our model is able to replicate the large drop
of the money market rate and the large increase in volumes at the standing facilities as observed
in the data.
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1.1. Related Literature. An increasing number of central banks are using channel systems or
at least some features of the channel system for implementing monetary policy. Versions of a
channel system are operated by the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the European Central
Bank (see Figure 1), the Reserve Bank of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. The
U.S. Federal Reserve System recently modified the operating procedures of its discount window
facility in such a way that it now shares elements of a standing facility.5
Despite the growing use of channel systems to implement monetary policy, only a few theor-
etical studies on its use exist. The earlier literature on channel systems or aspects of channel
systems were conducted in partial equilibrium models. Berentsen and Monnet (2008) contains a
discussion of these models. Berentsen and Monnet (2008) were the first to study monetary policy
in a channel system within a general equilibrium framework. In their framework, the central
bank requires a real asset as a collateral at its borrowing facility. Due to its liquidity premium,
the social return of this real asset is lower than the private return to a market participant. From
a social point of view, this results in an overaccumulation of the real collateral if the central bank
implements a zero interest-rate spread. Consequently, by implementing a positive spread, the
central bank can discourage the use of its borrowing facility and, thereby, improve the allocation.
Their key result is therefore that it is socially optimal to implement a strictly positive interest-
rate spread. However, this result hinges on the fact that collateral is a real asset that has a poor
rate of return and would never be accumulated if collateral constraints did not bind. Hence they
are socially ‘useless’ assets from a planner’s perspective.
In this paper, we also find that it is optimal to implement a non-zero spread. The reason
for this result, however, is very diﬀerent. In our model, the central bank’s borrowing facility
accepts government bonds as collateral. Government bonds are essentially pieces of paper that
are costless to produce and so there is no social waste in its use. Nevertheless, we also find
that it is optimal to implement a strictly positive interest-rate spread. Without taxing frictions,
the spread of the interest rate corridor is irrelevant. With taxing frictions, a non-zero corridor
5Prior to 2003, the discount window rate was set below the target federal funds rate, but banks faced penalties
when accessing the discount window. In 2003, the Federal Reserve decided to set the discount window rate 100
basis points above the target federal funds rate and eased access conditions to the discount window. The resulting
framework was similar to a channel system, where the deposit rate is zero and the lending rate 100 basis points
above the target rate. Furthermore, since October 2008, the Federal Reserve pays interest on required and excess
reserve balances.
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aﬀects the distribution of central bank money in a welfare improving way, consequently there is
an optimal spread.
Martin and Monnet (2010), which also builds on Berentsen and Monnet (2008), is a further
general equilibrium model of a channel system. The purpose of their paper is to compare the
feasible allocations that one can obtain when a central bank implements monetary policy either
with a channel system or via plain vanilla open market operations in the Lagos-Wright framework.
The focus in our paper is very diﬀerent. We only consider channel systems and derive the optimal
policy with and without taxing frictions. Furthermore, we calibrate the model to study the
behavior of the money market and the volumes traded at the standing facilities in response to
aggregate shocks. Moreover, we have a more complex structure of liquidity shocks than they have
which allows us to study how policy aﬀects the distribution of overnight-liquidity in a general
equilibrium model.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 describes the environment. Optimal
decisions by market participants are characterized in Section 3. Section 4 studies symmetric
stationary equilibria. Section 5 identifies the optimal policy if the central bank has no restrictions
in its ability to extract tax revenue to pay interest on reserves. Section 6 does the same if the
central bank faces restrictions in its ability to extract tax revenue. In Section 7 we calibrate
the model to the ECB’s channel system and derive the optimal interest-rate spread with taxing
frictions. Furthermore, we study how aggregate shocks aﬀect the behavior of the money market
and the volumes traded at the standing facilities of the ECB. Section 8 concludes. All proofs are
in the Appendix.
2. Environment
Our framework is motivated by the functioning of existing channel systems. For example,
as discussed in Berentsen and Monnet (2008), the key features of the ECB’s implementation
framework and of the euro money market are the following. First, at the beginning of the day,
any outstanding overnight loans at the ECB are settled. Second, the euro money market operates
between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m. Third, after the money market has closed, market participants can
access the ECB’s facilities for an additional 30 minutes. This means that after the close of the
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money market, the ECB’s lending facility is the only possibility for obtaining overnight liquidity.
Also, any late payments received can still be deposited at the deposit facility of the ECB.
To capture the above sequence of trading in the money market and at the central bank’s
standing facilities, we assume that in each period two markets open sequentially. The first
market is a money market, where market participants can trade money for bonds and where all
claims from the previous day are settled. The second market is a goods market where market
participants trade goods for central bank money. Its purpose is to generate a well defined demand
for central bank money.6 At the beginning of the goods market, agents receive an idiosyncratic
liquidity shock which generates a role for the central bank’s standing facility as explained below.7
In practice, only qualified financial intermediaries have access to the money market and the
central bank’s standing facilities. Nevertheless, these intermediaries act on the behalf of their
customers: households and firms. We simplify the analysis by assuming that the economy is
populated by infinitely-lived households who have direct access to the money market and the
central bank’s standing facilities. This simplifies the analysis and focuses and the varying liquidity
needs of agents in the economy rather than the process of intermediation.
There is a generic good in the economy that is nonstorable and perfectly divisible in each
market. Nonstorable means that they cannot be carried from one market to the next. There
are two types of households: buyers and sellers. Each type has measure 1. Buyers consume in
market 2 and consume and produce in market 1. Sellers produce in market 2 and can consume
and produce in market 1.
In market 2, a buyer gets utility () from consuming  units of the good, where () = log ()
and  is a preference shock which aﬀects the liquidity needs of buyers. The preference shock  has
a continuous distribution  () with support (0∞], is iid across buyers and serially uncorrelated.
Sellers incur a utility cost () =  from producing  units of market 2 goods. The discount
factor across periods is  = (1 + )−1  1 where  is the time rate of discount.
6In Section 2.2 we discuss the necessary assumption imposed on the exchange process that makes the use of central
bank money as a medium of exchange essential in market 2.
7This particular sequence of markets has been developed by Berentsen and Monnet (2008). Their model in turn,
is based on the divisible money model of Lagos and Wright (2005). The framework by Lagos and Wright (2005)
is useful because it allows us to introduce heterogeneous preferences while still keeping the distribution of money
balances analytically tractable.
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Figure 3: Sequence of events
The preference shock creates random liquidity needs among buyers. The buyers learn the
realization of the preference shock  after the money market has closed but before market 2
opens. This generates a role for the central bank’s standing facilities, since the money market is
already closed.8
As in Lagos and Wright (2005), for tractability, we impose assumptions that yield a degenerate
distribution of portfolios at the beginning of the goods market.9 That is, we assume that in the
money market agents can produce and consume goods. Goods are produced solely from inputs of
labor according to a constant returns to scale production technology where one unit of the good
is produced with one unit of labor generating one unit of disutility. Thus, producing  units of
goods implies disutility −, while consuming  units gives utility . The utility of consuming 
units of goods is () = .
2.1. First-best allocation. We assume without loss in generality that the planner treats all
sellers symmetrically. He also treats all buyers experiencing the same preference shock symmet-
rically. Given this assumption, the weighted average of expected steady state lifetime utility of
households and firms at the beginning of the money market can be written as follows
(2.1) (1− )W =
Z ∞
0
[ ()− ]  () + − 
8The interpretation for these shocks is that the −buyers are banks that receive liquidity shocks so late in the day
that they have to rely on the ECB’s standing facilities to readjust their portfolio.
9The idiosyncratic preference shocks play a similar role to that of random matching and bargaining in Lagos
and Wright (2005). Due to these shocks, households spend diﬀerent amounts of money in the goods market.
Then, without quasilinear preferences and unbounded hours in market 1, the preference shocks would generate a
nondegenerate distribution of money holdings, since the money holdings of individual households would depend
on their history of shocks.
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where  is hours worked by an −buyer in the money market,  is consumption of an −buyer
in the goods market, and  is production of a seller in the goods market. The planner maximizes
(2.1) subject to the feasibility constraintsZ ∞
0
 ()−  ≤ 0(2.2) Z ∞
0
 ()−  ≤ 0(2.3)
where  is consumption by a seller in the money market. The first-best allocation satisfies
(2.4) 0 (∗) = 1 for all 
These are the quantities chosen by a social planner who could dictate production and consumption
in the goods market.
2.2. Information frictions, money and bonds. There are two perfectly divisible financial
assets: money and one-period, nominal discount bonds. Both are intrinsically useless, since they
are neither arguments of any utility function nor are they arguments of any production function.
Both assets are issued by the central bank as described below.10 New bonds are issued in the
money market. They are payable to the bearer and default free. One bond pays oﬀ one unit of
currency in the money market of the following period. The central bank is assumed to have a
record-keeping technology over bond trades, and bonds are book-keeping entries — no physical
object exists. This implies that households are not anonymous to the central bank. Nevertheless,
despite having a record-keeping technology over bond trades, the central bank has no record-
keeping technology over goods trades.
At time , the central bank sells one-period, nominal discount bonds in market 1 and redeems
bonds that were sold in  − 1. Private households are anonymous to each other and cannot
commit to honor inter-temporal promises. Since bonds are intangible objects, they are incapable
of being used as media of exchange in market 2, hence they are illiquid.11 Since households are
10Strictly speaking, these bonds are not government bonds. Rather, these are nominal claims on the central bank
that are redeemable in central bank money. They resemble, for example, the SNB-bills issued by the Swiss National
Bank or term deposits issued to banks by the Federal Reserve.
11The beneficial role of illiquid bonds has been studied by Kocherlakota (2003), Shi (2008) and Berentsen and
Waller (2010). More recent models with illiquid assets include, Lagos and Rocheteau (2008), Lagos (2010), Lester,
Postlewaite and Wright (2010), and many others.
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anonymous and cannot commit, a household’s promise in market 2 to deliver bonds to a seller in
market 1 of the following period is not credible.
To motivate a role for fiat money, search models of money typically impose three assump-
tions on the exchange process (Shi 2008): a double coincidence problem, anonymity, and costly
communication. First, our preference structure creates a single-coincidence problem in market
2 since households do not have a good desired by sellers. Second, agents in market 2 are an-
onymous, which rules out trade credit between individual buyers and sellers. Third, there is no
public communication of individual trading outcomes (public memory), which, in turn, elimin-
ates the use of social punishments in support of gift-giving equilibria. The combination of these
frictions implies that sellers require immediate compensation from buyers. In short, there must
be immediate settlement with some durable asset, and money is the only durable asset. These
are the micro-founded frictions that make money essential for trade in market 2. Araujo (2004),
Kocherlakota (1998), Wallace (2001), and Aliprantis, Camera and Puzzello (2007) provide a more
detailed discussion of the features that generate an essential role for money. In contrast, in the
money market all agents can produce for their own consumption or use money balances acquired
earlier. In this market, money is not essential for trade.12
2.3. Central bank policy and the money supply process. At the beginning of market
1, after all preference shocks are observed, the central bank oﬀers a borrowing and a deposit
facility. The central bank operates at zero cost and oﬀers nominal loans  at an interest rate 
and promises to pay interest rate  on nominal deposits  with  ≥ . Let  = 1 (1 + ) and
 = 1 (1 + ). Since we focus on facilities provided by the central bank, we restrict financial
contracts to overnight contracts. An agent who borrows  units of money from the central bank
in market 2 repays (1 + )  units of money in market 1 of the following period. Also, an agent
who deposits  units of money at the central bank in market 2 receives (1 + )  units of money
in market 1 of the following period.
In a channel system, then the money stock evolves as follows
(2.5) + = − +  − + + + 
12One can think of agents as being able to barter perfectly in this market. Obviously in such an environment,
money is not needed.
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where  and  are the stock of money, respectively the stock of bonds, at the beginning of the
current-period money market, + and + the stock of money, respectively the stock of bonds,
at the beginning of the next-period money market,  the lump sum transfer,  the price of bonds
in the money market. In the money market, total loans  are repaid and total deposits  are
redeemed. Since interest-rate payments by the agents are , the stock of money shrinks by
this amount. Interest payments by the central bank on total deposits are . The central bank
simply prints additional money to make these interest payments, causing the stock of money to
increase by this amount. The central bank also issues new one-period bonds which it sells at
discount . This shrinks the amount of money by +. In the money market, it also redeems
the stock of bonds it issued in the previous period , which increases the stock of money by .
Finally, the central bank can also change the stock of money via lump-sum transfers  =  in
the money market.
3. Household decisions
The money price of goods in the money market is  , implying that the goods price of money
in the money market is  = 1 . Let  be the money price of goods in the goods market.
3.1. Money market. (   ) denotes the expected value of entering the money market
with  units of money,  bonds,  loans, and  deposits. ( ) denotes the expected value
from entering the goods market with units of money and  collateral. For notational simplicity,
we suppress the dependence of the value function on the time index .
In the money market, the problem of the representative buyer is:
(  ) = max00−+ 
¡0 0¢
 0 + 0 = + + +  (1 + ) −  (1 + ) + 
where  is hours worked in market 1, 0 is the amount of money brought into the goods market,
and 0 is the amount of bonds brought into the goods market. Using the budget constraint to
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eliminate  in the objective function, one obtains the first-order conditions
 0 ≤  ( = if 0  0 )(3.1)
 0 ≤  ( = if 0  0 )(3.2)
 0 ≡ (
00)
0 is the marginal value of taking an additional unit of money into the goods
market. Since the marginal disutility of working is one, − is the utility cost of acquiring one
unit of money in the money market.  0 ≡ (
00)
0 is the marginal value of taking additional
bonds into the goods market. Since the marginal disutility of working is 1, − is the utility
cost of acquiring one unit of bonds in the money market. The implication of (3.1) and (3.2) is
that all agents enter the goods market with the same amount of money and the same quantity
of bonds (which can be zero).
The envelope conditions are
(3.3)   =   = ;  =  (1 + ) ;  = − (1 + )
where   is the partial derivative of (  ) with respect to  =    .
3.2. Goods Market. We first consider the problem solved by sellers and then the one solved by
buyers. During the goods market, the central bank operates a borrowing facility and a deposit
facility which allows households to borrow at rate  and deposit unspent money at rate .
3.2.1. Decisions by sellers. Sellers produce goods in the goods market with linear cost  () = 
and consume in the money market obtaining linear utility () = . It is straightforward to
show that that sellers are indiﬀerent as to how much they sell in the goods market if
(3.4) + (1 + ) = 1
Since we focus on a symmetric equilibrium, we assume that all sellers produce the same amount.
With regard to bond holdings, it is straightforward to show that, in equilibrium, sellers are
indiﬀerent to holding any bonds if the Fisher equation holds and will hold no bonds if the yield
on the bonds does not compensate them for inflation or time discounting. Thus, for brevity of
analysis, we assume sellers carry no bonds across periods.
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It is also clear that sellers always deposit their proceeds from sales at the deposit facility, since
they can earn the interest rate .
3.2.2. Decisions by buyer. The indirect utility function of an −buyer in the goods market is
( | ) = max  () +  (+  −  −    | )
s.t. +  −  −  ≥ 0 and 
1 +  −  ≥ 0
where  is the amount of money an -buyer deposits at the central bank, and  is the loan
received from the central bank. The first inequality is the buyer’s budget constraint. The second
inequality is the collateral constraint. Let + denote the Lagrange multiplier for the first
inequality and denote + the Lagrange multiplier of the second inequality. Then, using (3.3)
to replace   ,   and   , the first-order conditions for , , and  can be written as follows:
(3.5)
0 ()− + (1 + ) = 0
 −  ≤ 0 (= 0 if   0)
− +  −  ≤ 0 (= 0 if   0)
Lemma 1 below characterizes the optimal borrowing and lending decisions by an −buyer and
the quantity of goods obtained by the −buyer:
Lemma 1. There exist critical values , , ¯, with 0 ≤  ≤  ≤ ¯, such that the following
is true: if 0 ≤   , a buyer deposits money at the central bank; if    ≤ ¯, he borrows
money and the collateral constraint is nonbinding; if ¯ ≤ , he borrows money and the collateral
constraint is binding; and if  ≤  ≤ , he neither borrows nor deposits money. The critical
values solve:
(3.6)  = (1 + )+,  = (1 + )+, and ¯ = (1 + )++ +.
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In any equilibrium, the amount of borrowing and depositing by a buyer with a taste shock  and
the amount of goods purchased by the buyer satisfy:
(3.7)
 = ,  =  ( − ) ,  = 0 if 0 ≤  ≤ 
 = ,  = 0,  = 0 if  ≤  ≤ 
 = ,  = 0,  =  ( − )  if  ≤  ≤ ¯,
 = ¯  = 0  =  if ¯ ≤ 
The optimal borrowing and lending decisions follow the cut-oﬀ rules according to the realization
of the taste shock. The cut-oﬀ levels, , , and ¯ partition the set of taste shocks into four
regions. For shocks lower than , a buyer deposits money at the standing facility; for shocks
higher than , the buyer borrows at the standing facility. For values between  and , the
buyer does not use the central bank’s standing facility. Finally, the cut-oﬀ value ¯ determines
whether a buyer’s collateral constraint is binding or not.
4. Equilibrium
We focus on symmetric stationary equilibria where money is used as a medium of exchange
and there is a positive demand for nominal government bonds. Such equilibria meet the following
requirements: (i) Households’ decisions are optimal, given prices; (ii) The decisions are symmetric
across all sellers and symmetric across all buyers with the same preference shock; (iii) The goods
and bond markets clear; (iv) All real quantities are constant across time; (v) The law of motion
for the stock of money (2.5) holds in each period.
Point (iv) requires that the real stock of money is constant; i.e.,
(4.1)  = ++
This implies that + = + ≡  where  is the gross steady-state money growth rate.
Symmetry requires  =+ and  = +. Let B =  denote the bonds-to-money ratio.
In any stationary equilibrium,  has to be constant. A constant bond price then implies that
the bond-to-money ratio has to be constant, and this can be only achieved when the growth rates
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of money and bonds are equal. We assume there are positive initial stocks of money 0 and
government bonds 0.13
Market clearing in the goods market requires
(4.2)  −
Z ∞
0
 () = 0
where  is aggregate production by sellers in the goods market.
In equilibrium, the critical values solve:
(4.3)  =  and ¯ = 

 (1 + B)
The critical values  and ¯ are functions of the interest rates  and , the bonds-to-money
ratio B, the critical value  and the price of bonds . In the Appendix, we show that  and 
solve equations (4.4) and (4.5) below.
Proposition 1. An equilibrium is a policy (  ) and endogenous variables ( ) satisfying

 =
Z
0
 () +
Z


 () +
¯Z


  () +
∞Z
¯

¯

  ()(4.4)

 =
¯Z
0
 () +
∞Z
¯

¯ ()(4.5)
A detailed derivation of (4.4)-(4.5) can be found in the Appendix. Equation (4.4) is obtained
from the choice of money holdings (3.1). Equation (4.5) is obtained from (3.1) and (3.2); in any
equilibrium with a strictly positive demand for money and bonds, we must have   ( ) =
  ( ). We then use this arbitrage equation to derive (4.5).
One can easily solve these two equations numerically for  and . All remaining endogenous
variables can then be calculated as follows: The critical values are obtained from (4.3). The
amount of borrowing and depositing by a buyer and the amount of goods purchased by the buyer
are obtained from (3.7); from (3.6), the real stock of money is  =  and the real stock of
13Since the assets are nominal objects, the central bank can start the economy oﬀ by one-time injections of cash
0 and bonds 0.
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bonds is  = (¯ − ) . Finally, from the law of motion of money holdings (2.5) one obtains
the value of  that is consistent with the policy choice (  ).
5. Optimal interest rate policy
The central bank chooses (  ) to maximize (2.1) subject to (4.4) and (4.5).
Proposition 2. The optimal policy is to set  =  = . This policy implements the first-best
allocation.
As in Cúrdia and Woodford (2010), it is optimal to set the deposit rate equal to the operating
target rate for the policy rate (the money market rate  in our model) in each period. The optimal
policy makes holding money costless and therefore satiates money demand as described by the
Friedman rule.14 In Cúrdia and Woodford (2010) the same policy satiates the demand for central
bank reserves. Note that such a policy means that the money market rate and the central bank’s
deposit rate exactly compensate market participants for their impatience and for inflation. To
see this, define  = (1− )  and  = −1 and rewrite  =  to get 1+  = (1 + ) (1 + ),
which is the Fisher equation. Under this policy, the rate of return of money is the same as the
rate of return on government bonds. Hence, they have the same marginal liquidity value, which
is zero.15 Finally, note that under the optimal policy the lending rate is irrelevant, since buyers
never borrow.
Corollary 1. The optimal policy requires that the central bank is able to raise tax revenue.
In the proof of Proposition 2, we show that the optimal policy requires that the central bank is
able to receive tax revenue to finance the interest payments on deposits. From the law of motion
of money holding, the lump-sum transfers that are necessary under the optimal policy are:
 ≡ ( − 1) (B + )  0
Thus, the optimal policy requires that the central bank is able to tax households directly or
receives funds from the treasury.16 Cúrdia and Woodford (2010) never discuss how the central
14See Andolfatto (2010) and Lagos (2010) who derive results on the optimality and implementation of the Friedman
rule in the Search Theory of Money.
15Since the first-best quantities are  =  with the support of  being unbounded, the real value of money
approaches infinity; i.e., the price level approaches zero. Any finite upperbound would yield a finite strictly
positive price level.
16Recall that   0 is a tax, and   0 a subsidy.
18 BERENTSEN, MARCHESIANI, AND WALLER
bank finances interest on reserves. Implicitly, they must assume that the central bank can directly
tax households or receives tax revenue from the treasury. It does not matter for the argument
whether the central bank holds government bonds that finances interest on reserves. In this case,
the government has to levy taxes to finance interest payments on the government bonds which
it then hands over to the central bank.
In practice, central banks have no fiscal power to levy taxes and therefore need to rely on the
treasury to provide the funds necessary to run the Friedman rule. Therefore, in the following
section we study the case where the central bank ability to tax is limited or, for political reasons,
the treasury is unwilling to transfer suﬃcient resources to run the Friedman rule. Under this
friction, we study the optimal policy.
6. Optimal interest rate policy with taxing frictions
In this section, we assume that the central bank faces taxing frictions and derive the optimal
interest rate policy for this case. In the previous section, we have shown that implementing the
first-best allocation requires the central bank to levy lump-sum taxes equal to  =   0. In
Definition 1 below, we define the term taxing friction. Define max as the largest feasible tax.
Definition 1. A central bank faces taxing friction if max  .
Note that it might well be that the central bank can raise taxes; i.e., max  0, but, the largest
tax satisfies 0  max  , preventing it from implementing the first-best allocation. A special
case would be max = 0; i.e., the central bank receives no tax revenue. In an economy with taxing
frictions, the central bank cannot set  = . That might be for technical reasons since raising
tax revenue is costly or it is politically costly to ask for tax revenues.
Lemma 2 below shows that if taxing frictions exist for the central bank, then in equilibrium
   (1 + ).
Lemma 2. In any equilibrium with taxing frictions    (1 + ).
In the proof of Lemma 2, we show that taxing frictions imply    (1 + ). We use this latter
condition to characterize the optimal policy in an economy with taxing frictions in Proposition
3 below.
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Proposition 3. If    (1 + ), it is optimal to choose a strictly positive interest rate spread.
Furthermore, under the optimal policy the money market rate must satisfy   .
Proposition 3 deviates from the optimal policy when there are no taxing frictions along two
dimensions. First, it is optimal to choose a strictly positive interest-rate spread. Recall that
without taxing frictions, the interest-rate spread is irrelevant. Second, with taxing frictions the
optimal policy is to set the deposit rate strictly below the money market rate. Thus, with taxing
frictions the optimal policy does not confirm the optimal policy in Cúrdia and Woodford (2010),
who recommend setting the deposit rate equal to the operating target rate for the policy rate
(the money market rate  in our model) in each period.
What is the economic rational for the optimality of a strictly positive spread? In the proof of
Proposition 3, we show that if    (1 + ) and if the central bank sets  = , then increasing
the loan rate marginally is strictly welfare improving. Thus, it is never optimal to have a zero
spread with taxing frictions. This result is driven by the reallocation of consumption that occurs
from increasing the loan rate as depicted in Figure 4.
Figure 4 graphically illustrates of why a strictly positive interest-rate spread is welfare improv-
ing. The black dotted linear curve (the 45-line) plots the first-best consumption quantities. The
red curve (labelled zero band) plots the quantities for some given policy    (1 + ) and a zero
spread; i.e.,  = . Up to some critical value for , ˜, the buyer receives the first-best consump-
tion quantities after which the collateral constraint is binding, as indicated by the consumption
quantities that are independent of . The blue curve (labelled positive band) plots the quantities
for the same policy    (1 + ) and a strictly positive spread; i.e.,   . Up to the critical
value , the buyer consumes the first-best quantity; i.e.,  = . For  ∈ [0 ] he deposits any
excess money at the deposit facility. For  ∈ [ ] he neither deposits nor borrows money. He
simply spends all the money brought into the period and consumes  = . For  ∈ [ ¯],
the buyer borrows but his collateral constraint is non-binding. Finally, for   ¯ the collateral
constraint is binding.
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Figure 4: Welfare eﬀects
As indicated by Figure 4, the welfare gain from increasing the borrowing rate  marginally
rises because it lowers the consumption of medium -buyers and increases the consumption of
high- buyers. The first eﬀect lowers welfare, while the second increases welfare. In the proof of
Proposition 3, we show that, starting from  = , the net gain is always positive.
The mechanism works as follows. By marginally increasing , the central bank makes it
relatively more costly to turn bonds into money and hence consumption. This aﬀects the portfolio
choice of agents in the money market. The demand for money and hence its value increases. For
those who are not borrowing-constrained, i.e., for buyers with  ∈ [ ¯] the higher marginal
borrowing cost lowers their consumption at the margin. However, starting from  = , this
welfare loss is of second order. For those who are borrowing-constrained, i.e., for buyers with
  ¯, the marginal higher borrowing cost has no eﬀect on their consumption yet their higher
real balances allow them to consume more. Again, starting from  = , this welfare gain is of
first order.
We have shown that, with taxing frictions, increasing the spread by increasing the loan rate
is always welfare improving starting from  = . Alternatively, one could consider lowering 
starting from  = . However, lowering  lowers the demand for money and hence its value,
which reduces consumption for all constrained buyers and does not increase the consumption of
unconstrained buyers. This is clearly welfare reducing (see the proof at the end of the Appendix).
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7. Money market rate
In the previous section we established that a strictly positive interest-rate spread is optimal if
the central bank cannot raise suﬃcient tax revenue to run the Friedman rule. A natural question
to ask is what the optimal size of the spread is. We can not answer this question analytically
because it depends on parameter values. Therefore, to get answers to this question, we now
calibrate the model to the ECB’s standing facilities.
Furthermore, we also use the calibration to study the behavior of the money market rate in the
euro area. As can be seen from Figure 1, the Eurepo money market rate fluctuates around the
middle of the ECB’s interest-rate corridor until the fall of 2008. Thereafter, it fluctuates closely
above the deposit rate set by the ECB. Moreover, the volume of deposits at the deposit facility
and the volume of borrowing at the marginal lending facility of the ECB changed dramatically
in response to the financial crisis that erupted after the Lehman bankruptcy. This can be seen
in Figure 2 in the Introduction.
For what follows, we distinguish between two periods: the pre-Lehman period and the post-
Lehman period. The former starts on March 4 2002 and ends on September 14 2008 and the
latter starts on September 15 2008 and ends on March 31 2010.17 Table 1, which we replicate
here for easier reference, displays the average daily volumes of trades at the deposit and lending
facilities of the ECB for the two periods. The average daily volume at the deposit facility of the
ECB prior to the Lehman bankruptcy was 260 million euros. After the bankruptcy the average
daily volume increased to 150092 million euros; i.e., it is now 578 times higher than before the
Lehman bankruptcy.
17We start the pre-Lehman period March 31 2002 because this is the first day the ECB reports the EUREPO rate.
22 BERENTSEN, MARCHESIANI, AND WALLER
Table 1: Volumes at the ECB
pre Lehman post Lehman ratio post/pre
Deposit Facility 260 150092 578
Marginal Lending Facility 195 1818 9.3
Ratio 1.33 82.6
Average daily volume in million euros at the deposit and lending facilities of the ECB.
Pre-Lehman data from 31.3.2002 until 14.09.2008; Post-Lehman data from 14.09.2008 until 31.03.2010.
The average daily volume at the marginal borrowing facility displays a similar pattern, although
the increase is less pronounced. The average daily volume prior to the Lehman bankruptcy was
195 million euros. After the bankruptcy, the average daily volume increased to 1818 million
euros; i.e., it is now 93 times higher. In Table 1, we also display the ratio of deposits to lending
prior to and after the Lehman bankruptcy. Beforehand, the ratio was 133 and now it is 826.
We will use the former ratio as a target for our calibration, as explained below.
To explain the break in the behavior of the money market rate and the dramatic increase in
the volumes at the deposit and borrowing facilities of the ECB after the Lehman bankruptcy we
now calibrate the model. We then explore two possible explanations. The first hypothesis is that
the Lehman bankruptcy triggered an aggregate variance shock that caused the Eurepo rate to
change its behavior and the increase of deposits and loans at the ECB’s standing facilities. The
second hypothesis is that the Lehman bankruptcy triggered a collateral shock.
7.1. Calibration and the optimal interest rate spread. For the calibration, we assume that
the model period is one day, and we only use data prior to the Lehman bankruptcy.18 Throughout
this paper, we report annualized interest rates. For the calibration we use the six targets listed
in Table 2. We use the average of the annualized daily Eurepo rate for the pre-Lehman period.
The average is 288%.19 For the same period, we calculate the annualized interest rates at the
lending facility and the deposit facility. The average values are 181% and 381%, respectively.
18We assume that a year has 300 days.
19We chose the Eurepo rate with the shorter maturity (less than one week), called the Eurepo TN rate, download-
able from www.eurepo.org.
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We assume that the annualized real interest rate is 2%, and we calculate the inflation rate for
this period. It is 232%. Finally, we use the ratio of deposits to lending at the ECB’s standing
facilities as explained in Table 1.
Table 2: Targets
EUREPO rate = 00288
Lending Facility: interest rate = 00381
Deposit Facility: interest rate = 00181
Real interest rate = 002
Inflation = 00232
Ratio of deposits to lending = 133
Interest rate targets are the average of the daily annualized rates.
Pre-Lehman data from 31.3.2002 until 14.09.2008.
Given these targets, the calibration is straightforward. The policy variables of the model are
,  and . We can directly use the deposit rate to set  = 0181 and the lending rate to set
 = 0381. We use the inflation target to set  = 10232 and the real interest rate target to
set  = 098. The utility function in the goods market is assumed to be () = 1−1− , and the
preference shocks are assumed to be random draws from a uniform distribution with support
[0  ].20 We set  = 1. We have experimented with other values for  , but it did not aﬀect
the calibration and simulation results at all. We are left with the two parameters  and B. We
simultaneously use the Eurepo rate target and deposit-to-lending target to pin down  and B.
We find B =1533 and  = 0278. The Mathematica file with the calculations is available on
request.
Given this parametrization we can calculate the optimal interest-rate spread. Our calibration
suggests that the ECB’s spread was too narrow in the pre-Lehman area. Given the deposit rate
of  = 0181, our calibration suggests that the optimal lending rate is 0067 instead of  = 0038
20The theoretical model presented earlier assumes  () = ln  and  →∞. These two assumptions simplify the
presentation of the model. However, it is straightforward to rewrite the model for the more general utility function
() = 1−
1− , and a distribution of the idiosyncratic −shocks with a finite upper bound  .
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as set by the ECB. Although this appears to be a large diﬀerence, our calibration suggests that
the welfare implications are negligible. We only find that welfare would have been higher by
000065 percentage points if the ECB’s had chosen  = 0067 instead of  = 0038.
The optimal interest-rate spread is independent of the value of  . Nevertheless, it does
depend on the choice of the distribution for the liquidity shocks . If we do the same experiment
for a log-normal distribution, we find a much larger optimal interest-rate spread. But again, the
welfare loss is modest. The message that can be taken from our calibration is that the welfare
loss of not choosing an optimal spread is likely to be small. In the next section, we consider how
well our model describes the behavior of the money market rate.
7.2. Money market rate after Lehman. In what follows we simulate the model to see how
well the model is able to track the money market rate and the volumes traded at the standing
facilities of the ECB prior and after the bankruptcy of Lehman brothers on September 15 2008.
To simulate the money market rate we use the daily values of the ECB’s deposit and borrowing
rates and solve (4.4) and (4.5) for  = 1 (1 + ) and  for each . In Figure 5 below, we
then plot the model-generated money market rate . Figure 5 shows that our model tracks the
Eurepo very well up to the bankruptcy of Lehman brothers on September 15 2008. After this
event, the Eurepo fluctuates very close to the deposit rate set by the ECB. Our simulated money
market rate does not follow this path, which suggest, that an aggregate shock aﬀected the money
markets around this time.
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Figure 5: Simulated money market rate.
Table 3 also shows that the model fails to account for the large increase in volumes at the
deposit and borrowing facilities of the ECB after the Lehman bankruptcy. In fact, in the simu-
lation the volumes stay almost the same in the pre-Lehman and post-Lehman periods, while in
the data they increase dramatically after the bankruptcy of Lehman brothers on September 15
2008.
Table 3: Simulated Eurepo and volumes at the ECB
pre-Lehman post-Lehman ratio post/pre
Eurepo 0.0289 (0.0288) 0.0171 (0.0112)
Deposit Facility 0.2384 0.2379 0.9981 (578)
Marginal Lending Facility 0.1792 0.1795 1.0015 (9.3)
Ratio 1.3305 (1.32) 1.3259 (82.6)
Average daily volume in million euros at the deposit and lending facilities of the ECB.
Pre-Lehman data from 31.3.2002 until 14.09.2008; Post-Lehman data from 14.09.2008 until 31.03.2010.
Data from Table 1 in parenthesis.
7.3. Aggregate shocks. We now propose two aggregate shocks that might explain the behavior
of the money market rate the large increase in volumes at the deposit and borrowing facilities of
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the ECB after the Lehman brother bankruptcy: an aggregate variance shock and an aggregate
collateral shock.
7.3.1. Aggregate variance shock. Here we assume that the Lehman bankruptcy triggered an ag-
gregate variance shock; i.e., it increased the variance of the idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. That
is, we assume that on September 15 2008 the upper bound of the uniform distribution jumps
from  = 1 for the pre-Lehman area to  = 45 for the post-Lehman area.
Table 4: Aggregate variance shock
pre-Lehman post-Lehman ratio post/pre
Eurepo 0.0289 (0.0288) 0.017 (0.0112)
Deposit Facility 0.2384 53.24 223 (578)
Marginal Lending Facility 0.179 40.152 224 (9.3)
Ratio 1.33 (1.32) 1.326 (82.6)
Data from Table 1 in parenthesis.
Table 4 summarizes the eﬀects of an aggregate variance shock. First, it does not aﬀect the
money market rate since the simulated money market rate is still 0.017 as for the case without
such a shock (see Table 3). Second, the volume at the deposit facility increases by a factor of
223. This is not enough to explain the increase by a factor of 578 in the data. Third, the volume
at the lending facility increases by the same factor. This is not consistent with the data where
it only increases by a factor of 9.3. Finally, the ratio of deposits to loans does not increase. The
reason is that this shock aﬀects the volumes at the deposit and lending facilities proportionately.
7.3.2. Aggregate collateral shock. Here we assume that Lehman triggered an aggragate collateral
shock in the money market. That is, we assume that the ratio of collateral to money dropped
after the Lehman bankruptcy. This seems to be a reasonable aggregate shock since the Leh-
man bankruptcy dramatically increased the uncertainty about the validity of certain collateral.
Moreover, the ECB and many other central banks increased the stock of central bank money,
which also reduced the ratio of collateral to money. To construct Table 5, we have decreased
the bonds-to-money ratio by 95%. That is, we assume that the bonds-to-money ratio dropped
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by 95% on September 15 2008 where it then stays until the end of the sample. As can be seen,
this drop can explain to a large extent the behavior of the money market rate after the Lehman
bankruptcy.
Table 5: Aggregate collateral shock
pre Lehman post Lehman ratio post/pre
Eurepo 0.0289 (0.0288) 0.0112 (0.0112)
Deposit Facility 0.2384 0.5919 2.48 (578)
Marginal Lending Facility 0.1792 0.0298 0.166 (9.3)
Ratio 1.33 (1.32) 19.866 (82.6)
Data from Table 1 in parenthesis.
Table 5 summarizes the eﬀects of an aggregate collateral shock. First, it decreases the money
market rate substantially. In fact, the model now matches the Eurepo for the pre-Lehman period
and the post-Lehman period. Second, the volume at the deposit facility increases by a factor
of 2.48. This is not enough to explain the increase in the data by a factor of 578. Third, the
volume at the lending facility decreases. This is not consistent with the data where it increases
by a factor of 9.3. Finally, the ratio of deposits to loans increases by a factor of 19.866 which is
again not enough to explain the increase in the data by a factor of 82.6.
7.3.3. Combined aggregate shocks. In what follows, we show that a combination of the two ag-
gregate shocks studied above can explain to a large extent the behavior of the money market
rate and the dramatic increase in volumes at the standing facilities of the ECB after the Lehman
bankruptcy.
Table 6 summarizes the eﬀects of a combined aggregate collateral and variance shock. To
obtain these numbers, we have simply combined the two shocks described above. We find the
following. First, the model simulation now matches the Eurepo for the pre-Lehman period and
the post-Lehman period. Second, the volume at the deposit ratio increases by a factor of 555.
This is consistent with the data where the increase is by a factor of 578. Third, the volume at
the lending facility increases by a factor of 33, which is too large since in the data it is only 9.3.
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Finally, the ratio of deposits to loans increases by a factor of 19.86, which is still not enough to
explain the increase in the data by a factor of 82.6.
Table 6: Combined aggregate shocks
pre-Lehman post-Lehman ratio post/pre
Eurepo 0.0288 (0.0288) 0.0112 (0.0112)
Deposit Facility 0.2384 132.4 555 (578)
Marginal Lending Facility 0.1792 6.66 37 (9.3)
Ratio 1.33 (1.32) 19.86 (82.6)
Data from Table 1 in parenthesis.
We believe that our model can successfully explain the behavior of the Eurepo and the volumes
at the standing facilities of the ECB after the Lehman bankruptcy if we simultaneously take into
account an aggregate variance and an aggregate collateral shock. This is not to say that other
factors did also aﬀect their behavior. Further research that identifies these factors could explain
some of the remaining discrepancies between our model simulation and the data.
8. Conclusions
The focus of this paper is to study optimal policy in a general equilibrium model where market
participants face idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, taking into account potential restrictions on the
central bank’s ability to extract tax revenue to pay interest on reserves. First, without restrictions
on the central bank’s ability to extract tax revenue, we prove that the optimal policy involves
setting the deposit rate equal to the target rate. Second, with restrictions on the central bank’s
ability to extract tax revenue, the optimal policy necessitates setting the deposit rate strictly
below the target rate, which involves a strictly positive interest-rate spread (the diﬀerence between
the lending rate and deposit rate). We then calibrate the model to the ECB’s channel system to
explain the behavior of the Eurepo and the volumes at the standing facilities of the ECB. We
find that if we simultaneously take into account an aggregate variance and an aggregate collateral
shock that hit the economy at the time of the Lehman bankruptcy, the model can successfully
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replicate the behavior of the Eurepo and the volumes at the standing facilities of the ECB before
and after the Lehman bankruptcy.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. We first derive the cut-oﬀ values  and . For this proof, to the notation of
the consumption level of a buyer, we add a subscript  if the buyer deposits money at the central
bank, a subscript  if the buyer takes out a loan and the collateral constraint is nonbinding, a
subscript ¯ if the buyer takes out a loan and the collateral constraint is binding, and a subscript
0 if the buyer does neither.
From (3.5), the consumption level of a buyer who enters the loan market satisfies:
(8.1)  () = + (1 + ) ,  () =

+ (1 + ) ,
where we have used the functional form  () = ln ().
A buyer who does not use the deposit facilities will spend all his money on goods, since, if he
anticipated that he would have idle cash after the goods trade, it would be optimal to deposit
the idle cash in the intermediary, provided   0. Thus, consumption of such a buyer is:
(8.2) 0 () =  .
At  = , the household is indiﬀerent between depositing and not depositing. We can write this
indiﬀerence condition as:
 ()− + ( − ) =  (0)− +0.
By using (8.1), (8.2), and  = − , we can write the equation further as
 ln
∙ 
+ (1 + )
¸
=  − (1 + )+.
The unique solution to this equation is  = (1 + )+, which implies that +  .
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At  = , the household is indiﬀerent between borrowing and not borrowing. We can write
this indiﬀerence condition as
 ()− + ( + ) =  (0)− +0.
Using (8.1), (8.2) and  =  −, we can write this equation further as
 ln
∙ 
(1 + )+
¸
=  − (1 + )+
The unique solution to this equation is  = (1 + )+. Using the expression for  we get
(8.3)  =  () 
We now calculate ¯. There is a critical buyer who enters the goods market and wants to take
out a loan, whose collateral constraint is just binding. From (3.5), for this buyer we have the
following equilibrium conditions: ¯ = ¯+ and ¯ = + . Eliminating ¯ we get
¯ = (1 + )++ +
Using (8.3) we get
¯ = 
µ
1 +  
¶

It is then evident that
0 ≤  ≤  ≤ ¯
¤
Proof of Proposition 1. In this proof we derive equations (4.4) and (4.5). We first derive equation
(4.4). Diﬀerentiate  ( ) =
∞R
0
 ( | )  () with respect to  to get
  ( ) =
∞Z
0
£  (+  −  −    | ) + +¤  () 
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Then, use (3.3) to replace   and (3.5) to replace + to obtain
(8.4)   ( ) =
∞Z
0
0 ()
  () 
Use the first-order condition for  in (3.4) to get
  ( ) = + (1 + )
∞Z
0
0 ()  () 
Using (3.1) to replace   ( ) and (4.1) to replace the + yields

 = (1 + )
∞Z
0
0 ()  () 
Finally, note that 0 () = 1 and replace  using Lemma 1 to get
(8.5)

 =
Z
0
 () +
Z


 () +
¯Z


  () +
∞Z
¯

¯

  ()
Note that since  =   and ¯ =
³
 
´
(1 + B), (8.5) yields .
We obtain the second equation that determines  as follows. In any equilibrium with a strictly
positive demand for money and bonds, we must have   ( ) =   ( ). We now use this
arbitrage equation to derive (4.5). We have already derived   ( ) above. To get   ( )
diﬀerentiate  ( ) by  to get
  ( ) =
∞Z
0
h
  (+  −  −    | ) + +
i
 () 
Use (3.3) to replace   to get
  ( ) = +
∞Z
0
(1 + )  () 
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Use (3.5) to replace  and rearrange to get
  ( ) =
¯Z
0
+ () +
∞Z
¯
 
0 ()
  () 
Use the first-order condition for  in (3.4) to get:
  ( ) =
¯Z
0
+ () +
∞Z
¯
+ () 0 ()  () 
Equate   ( ) =   ( ) and simplify to get
∞Z
0
0 ()  () =
¯Z
0
()  () +
∞Z
¯
() 0 ()  () 
Note that
∞R
0
0 ()  () =  and use Lemma 1
(8.6)

 =
¯Z
0
 () +
∞Z
¯

¯ () 
Note that since  =   and ¯ =
³
 
´
(1 + B),  depends on  only. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2. Setting  =  reduces (4.4) and (4.5) as follows

 =
R
0
 () +
R


 () +
¯R


 () +
∞R
¯

¯

 ()

 =
¯R
0
 () +
∞R
¯

¯ () 
Then, equilibrium requires that
R
0
 () +
R


 () +
¯R


 () +
∞R
¯

¯

 () =
¯R
0
 () + ∞R
¯

¯ ()
This equation holds if and only if  −→∞. Then, from (4.3),  ¯ −→∞. Thus, from Lemma
1, the first-best allocation  =  for all  is attained. Moreover, from (4.5), it is clear that the
money market rate must satisfies  = .
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We next show that the optimal policy requires that the government is able to tax agents. We
first derive the law of motion of money holdings in equilibrium. In any equilibrium, the sellers’
money holdings satisfy
 = + −
Z
0
( − )  () 
The left-hand side is the aggregate money receipts of sellers. The right-hand side is the beginning
of period quantity of money,  ; plus aggregate lending of money by the central bank, ; minus
deposits by late-buyers at the central bank. These buyers simply deposit any "idle" money to
receive interest on it. Furthermore, in any equilibrium aggregate deposits satisfy
 =  +
Z
0
( − )  () 
where  is deposits by sellers. These two equations imply that in any equilibrium, total deposits
satisfy
(8.7)  = + 
From Lemma 1, we know that only buyers with a shock  ≥  borrow. Thus aggregate lending
is  = ∞R

 (). From Lemma 1, we also know that  =  [() − ] if  ≤  ≤ ¯, and
 =  (1 + ) =  [() ¯ − ] if  ≥ ¯. Thus, real aggregate lending is
(8.8)  = Ψ
where
Ψ ≡
¯Z

[() − ]  () +
∞Z
¯
[() ¯ − ]  () 
Divide both sides of (2.5) by  to get
 = 1 +  −  + B (1− ) +  
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Eliminating and  using (8.7), respectively (8.8), and noting that = , the last expression
can be rewritten as follows
(8.9)  = 1 +  +  −  Ψ+ B (1− ) +  
Finally, under the optimal policy  =  we have  = . Replacing  and  by  and noting
that Ψ = 0 under the optimal policy yields
 =  ≡ ( + B) ( − 1) ≤ 0
Thus, the optimal policy requires that the central bank is able to raise tax revenue. ¤
Proof of Lemma 2. In an economy with taxing frictions,    = ( + B) ( − 1). Use (8.9)
to substitute  to get
 − (1 + )−  −  Ψ− B (1− )  ( + B) ( − 1) 
Rewrite the previous expression to get
 − (1 + ) +  −  Ψ+ B ( − 1)  0
In any equilibrium, − Ψ ≥ 0 and  ≥ 1. Hence, in any equilibrium with taxing frictions,
 − (1 + )  0
¤
Proof of Proposition 3. Equations (4.4) and (4.5) are block recursive. We can first solve (4.4) for
.21 Once we know , we get  from (4.5).
21Such a value exists and is unique, since the right-hand side of (4.4) is decreasing in . Furthermore, the right-
hand side is approaching infinity for  → 0 and is approaching 1 for  →∞. Accordingly, there exists a unique
value for  ∈ (0∞) that solves (4.4) if   1.
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The welfare function is
W =
Z
0
[ ()− ]  () +
Z

[ ()− ]  ()(8.10)
+
¯Z

[ ()− ]  () +
∞Z
¯
[ ()− ]  () 
To show that it is never optimal to choose a zero band, we calculate W, evaluate it  =
 = , and then show that W|==  0.
Note that  aﬀects W directly and indirectly via ; that is
W
 =
W


 +
W
 
We get the term  by taking the total derivative of the equilibrium equation (4.4), which we
replicate here for easier reference:

 =
Z
0
 () +
Z


 () +
¯Z


  () +
∞Z
¯

¯ () 
From this equation, we get

 = −
¯R


()2 () +
∞R
¯
B
(1+B)2 ()
R


()2 () +
∞R
¯

()2(1+B) ()
 0
since  =   and ¯ = 
 (1 + B).
The partial derivative W is
W
 =
Z
0
£0 ()− 1¤  () +
Z

£0 ()− 1¤  ()
+
¯Z

£0 ()− 1¤  () +
∞Z
¯
£0 ()− 1¤  () 
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Using (3.7), we can write this partial derivative as follows:
(8.11)
W
 =
Z

£0 ()− 1¤  () + ∞Z
¯
£0 ()− 1¤ (1 + B)  () 
Note that W is strictly positive.
For W we get
W
 =
Z
0
£0 ()− 1¤  () +
Z

£0 ()− 1¤  ()
+
¯Z

£0 ()− 1¤  () +
∞Z
¯
£0 ()− 1¤  () 
which using (3.7) can be written as
W
 =
¯Z

£0 ()− 1¤  () +
∞Z
¯
£0 ()− 1¤ B () 
which is strictly positive. This implies that W can be either positive or negative. Increasing 
(decreasing ) has a positive eﬀect on welfare through its direct eﬀect W , but an negative eﬀect
through its indirect eﬀect W  .
We now evaluate these derivatives at  =  = . We get


¯¯¯¯
==
= −
¯R

 () + ∞R
¯
B
¯(1+B) ()
∞R
¯

¯ ()
W

¯¯¯¯
==
=
∞Z
¯
£0 ()− 1¤ B ()
W

¯¯¯¯
==
=
∞Z
¯
£0 ()− 1¤ (1 + B)  () 
since  =  and ¯ =  (1 + B) at  =  = . Use these expressions to write W
¯¯¯
==
as
follows
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W

¯¯¯¯
==
= −
∞Z
¯
£0 ()− 1¤  () (¯)
2
¯R

 ()
 ∞R
¯
 ()
 0
Hence, a marginal decrease of  (marginal increase of ) from  =  =  is welfare improving.
It follows that a zero band is not optimal policy if   . ¤
Proof that W  0. The welfare function is
W =
Z
0
[ ()− ]  () +
Z

[ ()− ]  ()(8.12)
+
¯Z

[ ()− ]  () +
∞Z
¯
[ ()− ]  () 
To show that it is never optimal to lower  if   1 + , we calculate W. Note that 
aﬀects W directly and indirectly via ; that is
W
 =
W


 +
W
 
We get the term  by taking the total derivative of the equilibrium equation (4.4) which we
replicate here for easier reference:

 =
Z
0
 () +
Z


 () +
¯Z


  () +
∞Z
¯

 (1 + B) () 
From this equation, we get

 = −

 −
¯R

1 ()
R


()2 () +
∞R
¯

()2(1+B) ()
 0
since  =   and ¯ = 
 (1 + B).
38 BERENTSEN, MARCHESIANI, AND WALLER
The partial derivative W is
W
 =
Z
0
£0 ()− 1¤  () +
Z

£0 ()− 1¤  ()
+
¯Z

£0 ()− 1¤  () +
∞Z
¯
£0 ()− 1¤  () 
Using (3.7), we can write this partial derivative as follows:
W
 =
Z

£0 ()− 1¤  () + ∞Z
¯
£0 ()− 1¤ (1 + B)  () 
Note that W is strictly positive.
For W we get
W
 =
Z
0
£0 ()− 1¤  () +
Z

£0 ()− 1¤  ()
+
¯Z

£0 ()− 1¤  () +
∞Z
¯
£0 ()− 1¤  () 
which using (3.7) can be written as
W
 = −
¯Z

£0 ()− 1¤ 
()2
 ()  0
which is strictly negative. This implies that W is negative. Thus, increasing  (decreasing )
has a negative eﬀect on welfare. It follows that increasing  is optimal if   . ¤
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